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Perpetual Property 
 
SARAH HARDING∗ 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Property interests, unlike contract, tend to adhere to a limited set of 
specific forms – the numerus clausus principle.1 This distinction has been 
the subject of much scholarship in the past decade in an attempt to 
understand both the nature of and the reasons for the limitation on property 
forms that exist within the common law.2 While these limitations on form 
are both intriguing and central to the common law, equally significant are 
the temporal limitations embedded in property law – property interests are 
typically defined by and thus only defensible for a specific time period. 
Even the fee simple, a property interest of supposedly infinite duration, is 
Copyright © Sarah K. Harding 
∗ Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. . This paper was primarily 
written during a research fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University. I am grateful for the comments of my colleagues 
and participants in workshops there and at Chicago-Kent, in particular Ian Ayres, 
Katharine Baker, John Braithwaite, Jennifer Brown, Peter Cane, Peter Drahos, 
Kevin Gray, Steve Heyman, Imelda Maher, Colin Scott, Jane Stapleton and 
Adrienne Stone.  
1 See Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000)(“In the 
common law, the principle that property rights must conform to certain 
standardized forms has no name. In the civil law, which recognizes the doctrine 
explicitly, it is called the numerus clausus--the number is closed.”) 
2 See Merrill and Smith, supra. note 1; Henry Hansmann and Rainer Kraakman, 
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the 
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Michael Heller, The 
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999). Bernard Rudden, 
Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem in OXFORD 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 239 (JOHN EEKELAAR & JOHN BELL eds., Third Series, 
1987). 
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limited in time by a number of overarching rules often referred to as “rules 
furthering marketability.”3 
Like the numerus clausus principle, these temporal limitations have 
been relatively tenacious, limiting the longevity and remote vesting of 
property interests for much of the recent history of the common law of 
property. The most infamous and controversial of these limitations is the 
somewhat quizzical rule against perpetuities. But recently many of these 
limitations have begun to disappear. In a number of discrete but significant 
areas of property law, temporal limitations are being stretched beyond 
recognition or are disappearing altogether giving rise to more enduring and 
in some cases more fragmented property interests. So while limitations on 
the forms of property interests remain relatively stable, limitations on the 
duration of some property interests are disappearing giving rise to a 
growing number of perpetual property interests.  
This paper explores the emergence of perpetual property in a 
number of discrete areas of property law: the longevity of servitudes in 
historic and environmental protections, the ever growing time span of 
intellectual property rights, and the disappearance of the rules against 
perpetual interests.  While the demise of these and other temporal 
limitations is itself worthy of recognition and will be the focus of a major 
part of this paper, my primary interest is whether these changes tell us 
something about shifting cultural attitudes to the institution of private 
property. If it is the case, as a number of prominent sociologists have 
argued, that an exploration of social attitudes toward time is indispensable 
to an understanding of our current cultural conditions then exploring 
temporal limitations in property law will presumably help us better 
understand what Professor Radin has called the “cultural commitments of 
property.”4 This topic is particularly compelling when one considers that 
the emergence of perpetual property, with its embedded expectations of 
stability and permanence, has occurred at a time when speed, flexibility and 
impermanence are dominant features of our current social conditions.  The 
emergence of perpetual property within the larger experience of 21st 
century living and “time-space compression” is nothing short of 
paradoxical.   
Section I of this paper begins with a brief exploration of time in 
property, from the abstract theories that justify and delineate entitlements to 
the concrete doctrines temporally constraining ownership interests.  The 
3 DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER, SCHILL, PROPERTY (6th ed, 2006). 
4 Margaret J. Radin, Government Interests and Takings: Cultural Commitments of 
Property and the Role of Political Theory, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 168 
(1993). 
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institution of private property, Carol Rose has argued, functions within the 
expectations of “an agrarian or a commercial people – a people whose 
activities with respect to the objects around them require an unequivocal 
delineation of lasting control...”5 The primary contention in this section is 
that the temporal realities in the institution of private property are essential 
to the broader social expectations and conditions inherent in such a society.  
Section II addresses the changes in property law affecting temporal 
limitations, beginning with those concerning the control of property in the 
distant future. Here the two most notable changes are the slow 
disappearance of the rule against perpetuities and the rise of perpetual 
servitudes in the areas of environmental conservation and historic 
preservation. In addition this section will look briefly at the increasing 
longevity of intellectual property rights. The second half explores the 
reclamation of property from the past, in particular the meteoric rise in both 
the number and success of repatriation claims. Most of the changes 
discussed in this paper are based in U.S. law, but I also draw on material 
from other common law jurisdictions with the expectation of making at 
least tentative claims about shifts in the cultural significance of private 
property within common law systems.  
Section III discusses some plausible explanations for the 
emergence of perpetual property. It is important to note that there are a 
variety of diverse and complex first order explanations for the changes 
discussed in this paper, explanations that may have little to do with the 
temporal limitations themselves. For example the disappearance of the rule 
against perpetuities may be the consequence of changes to the tax code and 
the increasing length of copyright the result of a powerful entertainment 
industry lobby.  And yet in each area the temporal changes are intentional 
and significant. Collectively they pose a phenomenon worth exploring 
particularly given the common law’s traditional abhorrence of perpetual 
property interests.  Furthermore, it may be the case that considering these 
changes collectively reveals important underlying shared characteristics 
justifying the proposition of an emerging category in which our collective 
yearnings for stability in a rapidly changing world manifest themselves in a 
desire for longer lasting interests. In the final analysis I argue that it is this 
increasing collective desire for permanence, for a slowing of time in some 
select areas, not the fundamental and absolute nature of property rights as 
 
5 Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHICAGO L.R. 73, 87 
(1985). 
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others have argued,6 that helps explain the emergence of perpetual 
interests.  
 
ear and cyclical representations, so 
law part
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ill. In this 
I. TIME AND PROPERTY 
A. General Conceptions of Time in Law 
 
At the most abstract of levels the law operates within specific 
conceptions of time. It is legitimated as much through its temporal 
representations as through its spatial or territorial limitations – it is both 
here and now. But just as our cultural conceptions of time are complicated 
and contradictory, dependent on both lin
akes of such indeterminancies. The “now” is both the present and 
all times, at once specific and general.   
In her insightful discussion of conceptions of time in the operation 
of law, Carol Greenhouse argues that the common law simultaneously 
draws on two conceptions of time. On the one hand it “reflects perfectl
logic of linear time.”7 It depends on past articulations through the doctrine 
of precedent not merely as substantively persuasive legal ideas but as 
statements that have the benefit of time itself. Common law courts de
on a “pervasive traditionality”8 in decision-making - the past is relevant 
“for its own sake.”9 The circularity of this is countered by the linear 
conception of reform. While constantly embedding itself in the past, law
also expresses itself as an engine of reform and progress. Law as reform or 
as a constantly improving set of ideas has been a particularly pervasive
view since the great reformers of the late 18th c. – Bentham and M
 
6 See, e.g. Richard Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law 
of Property, 64 WASHINGTON U. L.Q. 667, 795 (1986). 
7 Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of 
Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1640 (1989)(The reception of linear time in the West 
was, Greenhouse writes, the product of Christianity but was secularized in 
medieval times).. 
8 Martin Krygier, Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory, 7 OXFORD J. OF LEG. 
ST. 26 (1987). 
9 Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition 99 YALE L.J. 1029 
(1990)(exploring the importance of the principle of stare decisis and a more 
general respect for the past not in terms of utilitarian or deontological 
considerations but as a pervasive and intrinsic feature of culture: “It is only on that 
condition--on the basis of a traditionalism which honors the past for its own sake--
that the world of culture can be sustained.” 1068) 
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way law and the legal resolution of disputes strings together the past, 
present and future thus perfecting representations of linear time.  
 
But, Greenhouse argues, “the common law also
eyond linear time.”  While its linear presentati
nce on the possibility of change suggest incom
oment the common law “represents a to
 It is by definition complete, yet its 
completeness does not preclude change. It is a
human achievement, yet by its reversible and 
lateral excursions, and by its collective voice,
it is not identifiably the product of any 
particular individual or group. Symbolically, 
it stands at the
zones of Indo-European thinking – the human-
made … and the divine …- and is nourished 
by the indeterminacy of the distinction 
between events in linear time and possibilities 
(all-times). 10 
 It is the representation of these two conceptions of time that, 
Greenhouse argues, generates the mythic dimension of law and as such sets 
it apart from other dispute-focused, norm-creating institutions. By being 
both “in time” and “out of time” the law is capable of sustaining its 
mythical status and its connected claims to neutrality.  
 First year law students in common law systems know this tension 
very well, even if it is rarely acknowledged. They learn in the first
their legal studies the notion of precedent and stare decisis; the importance
of rationalizing legal opinions by resorting to past decisions, the more 
prominent the better. But students are also conditioned to present legal 
solutions as being “out of time,” as part of a continuous whole that has, for 
the most part, always been as it is.  Constancy, not change, is the 
foundation of persuasive legal arguments. The curious timeless nature of 
the common law, its mythical status, is also cap
 the idea that judges only find and declare the common law, mere
identifying its true nature, rather than making it up as they go along.  Whil
a strong version of the declaratory theory may be out of fashion among 
legal thinkers and judges, the notion that law pre-exists judicial decis
making still has a place in the common law.11  
10 Greenhouse, supra. note 7 at 1640. 
11 Richard Tur, Time and Law 22 OXFORD J. OF LEG. ST. 463, 471 (2002).  
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ation rather than specific substantive areas within the law. But we 
can borrow her notion of the temporalities of the law to explore specific 
substantive areas. If, as G  engages specific 
mporal logics as a means of legitimating itself within the larger culture do 
specific f 
and 
  So just 
ant 
that, 
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explana ial 
ly 
 separate 
 a 
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Jane Radin has noted that “the temporal dimension is irrelevant to the 
 the precise 
Greenhouse was writing broadly about the common law and its 
legitim
reenhouse writes, the law
te
 areas of law represent their subject matter within a conception o
time?  
B. Time and Property 
 
Property as a subset of the common law is dependent on these 
broad and competing conceptions of time but additionally it produces 
depends upon specific temporal representations of property itself.
as “law – as an idea – carries cultural force because it engages [certain] 
temporalities” 12 so property law engages specific temporalities as relev
to its subject matter.  At the most abstract level, Carol Rose notes 
contrary to expectations, traditional theorizing about property almost 
inevitably takes “a striking turn toward a narrative 
tory mode where … time and cumulative experience play essent
roles.”13 In such accounts, property as an institution is explicable on
through a series of events emerging over time – a story in Rose’s 
terminology - rather than as an analytically derived system whose
parts are immediately discernible and predictable. 
 If Rose is right, we can see how theorizing about property has 
relied on the same cultural expectation of linearity that Greenhouse 
suggests is embedded in the common law broadly speaking; essential to
diachronic explanation of the institution of private property is an 
assumption of progress over time. But equally apparent in Rose’s analysis 
of the structure of property theories is the “out of time” element. Whil
many of the most important figures in the history of property theory must 
rely on stories to arrive at an explanation for property rights, the rights 
themselves are presented as being self-ordained - or natural. Locke’s theory
of entitlements, for example, depends on a series of connected assumptions
about the self and the products of individual effort14 and in this sense 
emerges like a moral from a cautionary tale. On the other hand, Margaret 
Lockean theory of property” in that it concerns itself with only
 
12 Greenhouse, supra. note 7 at 1650. 
13 CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 26 (1994). 
14 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 25, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 327 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1960) (1st ed. London 1690). 
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As with the importance of diachronic explanations for the 
develop
al 
concept in the common law of property, the fee simple, is defined as a 
temporally unbounded interest, all lesser estates are defined by precise time 
19
moment of acquisition, ignoring the larger “temporal dimension of human 
affairs.”15 Both of these observations ring true and are not contradictor
rather reinforce Rose’s suggestion that while traditional property theories 
tend to rationalize property as a self-evident and timeless institution, they 
very much depend on “time and cumulative experience.” S
an be seen as an instance of law’s broader mythic dimension – both
embedded in the constant flux and change of society while simultaneously 
presenting itself as unchanging and existing for all times.  
If we move from the structures of property theories to the theo
and doctrines themselves, the relevance of time to property becomes ev
more apparent. Certainly one of the most ubiquitous concepts in the 
establishment of property rights is “first in time” – the first person to 
possess the property in question has priority over all others.16  Robert 
Sugden argues that “first in time” is one of the primary conventions in both
formal and informal justifications of private property.17 To this we can
the idea of intent of “lasting control”18 as another central feature of theorie
about successful ownership claims.  While these concepts are compli
by difficulties in ascertaining what constitutes firstness or control, th
person “first in time” with the intent to exercise “lasting control” in wa
that are clearly recognizable by others is nonetheless more likely to 
succeed. 
ment of private property, the ubiquity of first in time theories 
reinforces the importance of linearity in the creation of cognizable property 
rights.   
At the doctrinal level property law utilizes culturally determined 
time frames to create, limit and destroy property interests. While the centr
limitations – a life, 99 years, a month etc.  The fee simple, an interest of 
 
15 Margaret Jane Radin Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 
rd A. Epstein , Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law 
MICS OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION AND WELFARE 87-
n 
d 
bsist for an uncertain period, 
739-40 (1986). 
16 See Richa
of Property 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 669-74 (1986)(detailing the importance of the 
first in time or “first come, first served” principle in property law).  
17 ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONO
97 (1986). 
18 See Rose, Possession, supra. note 5 at 87 (“the common law of first possession 
… requires an unequivocal delineation of lasting control so that those objects ca
be either managed or traded.”) 
19 2 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 103(“First, with regard to the quantity of 
interest which the tenant has in the tenement, this is measured by it's duration an
extent. Thus, either his right of possession is to su
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“potentially infinite duration”20 fits well with and no doubt even 
encourages a belief in absolute, unfettered property interests, despite the 
fact it too is subject to temporal constraints. It reinforces Greenhouse’s 
observation, that law and legal interests are represented as being both “in 
time” and “out of time.” An absolute right of infinite duration is “out of 
time,” lacking clear temporal definition, but just as the notion of absolute 
ownership is a misconception or a myth21 so too the idea of perpetual 
ownership has never been accurate. In other words while an intent of 
“lasting control” might be important in establishing property rights, real 
control over too long a period of time can in fact be used to quash those 
very same interests. Arguably this is the whole point of the various “rules 
furthering marketablity.”22 
 There are numerous ways the common law limits property 
interests to a specified time period in order to maintain clarity in ownership 
and free alienability. The most infamous and direct of these temporal 
constraints is the rule against perpetuities, discussed in greater detail below. 
Legislatures have also imposed time limitations predominantly through 
statutes of limitations. These temporal restraints effectively terminate some 
property interests while recognizing others based on little more than the 
passage of time.23 They can be generic, as is the case with legislation 
regarding adverse possession, or specific, for example marketable title acts 
during his own life, or the life of another man; to determine at his own decease, or 
of years, month, or days: or, lastly, it is infinite and unlimited, being 
that 
 
RTY AND 
9)(“The ideology of property as 
ple 
on the passage of time, See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy 
Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO.L.J. 2419 (2001)(ultimately isolating the 
endowment effect or loss-aversion theory as the most plausible justification for 
adverse possession). 
to remain to his descendants after him: or it is circumscribed within a certain 
number 
vested in him and his representatives for ever.”) 
20 HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 94 (5TH ed. 
2001).  
21 See LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 2 (2003)(“The idea 
property rights – particularly those involving land – are presumptively free from
collective claims has been decisively abandoned, if ever it was true.”); Kevin Gray 
and Susan Gray, Private Property and Public Propriety in PROPE
CONSTITUTIONS 11, 15 (Janet McLean ed., 199
uncontrolled exclusory power is nowadays just as untenable as is the dichotomous 
distinction between the domains of the private and the public.”) 
22 See Dukeminier and Krier, supra. note 4 at. 
23 While adverse possession has many elements, the most unwavering is the sim
passage of time. For a discussion of the many justifications for adverse possession, 
many of which hinge 
DRAFT COPY 8/28/2008  3:12:19 PM 
[2008]  PERPETUAL PROPERTY 9 
 
ainst 
ncy-
daries.   
 
terminating stale claims24 or limitations on the duration of certain 
defeasible interests.25 
 
C. Time and Boundaries 
 
Property as a temporally bounded notion fits comfortably with the 
many other ways in which property law depends on boundaries. The most 
significant limiting factor or “boundary” in property is the limited number 
of carefully defined interests that are cognizable and enforceable as 
property interests – the numerous clauses principle. 26 According to 
Michael Heller, private property is circumscribed by a host of rules that 
attempt to protect against inefficient arrangements, predominantly 
commons (“overlapping rights of use in a commons”) and anti-commons 
(“too many rights of exclusions.”)27  Heller argues that although the 
various metaphors for conceptualising property, particularly the physical 
thing and the bundle of rights metaphors, have generally obscured the 
“nuanced way law enforces property boundaries,” such conceptual 
boundaries have been pivotal to the ongoing vitality of private property.28 
Rules that limit “inter-temporal fragmentation,” such as the rule ag
perpetuities, are according to Heller, key examples of such efficie
producing boun 29
While Professor Heller and others firmly ground their observations 
concerning the numerus clausus in an efficiency framework,30 specifically 
the role of law in protecting and encouraging the productive use of 
24 See, e.g. The Uniform Marketable Title Act (1990)(“The Model Act is designed 
to assure a title searcher who has found a chain of title starting with a document at 
least 30 years old that he need search no further back in the record.”)  
25 See, e.g. 765 ILCS 330/4 (limiting possibilities of reverter and rights of entry or 
re-entry to 40 years.) 
26 See Merrill and Smith, supra. note 1. 
27 Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1195 
(1999) 
28 Id. at 1187-1194. 
29 Id. at 1176-1182. But see Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property 
Theory: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
Third Series 239 (John Eekelaar and John Bell eds., 1987)(questioning efficiency 
based justifications for the standardization of property interests).  
30 Heller focuses on antifragmentation as the key efficiency aspect of the numerus 
clausus, but Merrill and Smith focus on the standardization /efficiency function, 
Merrill and Smith supra. note 1;  and Hansmann and Kraakman, also writing in 
this area focus on the verification/efficiency function, Hansmann and Kraakman, 
supra note 2.  
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resources, other accounts of the core of private property recognize the 
relevance of boundaries in a broader social, cultural context. At a very 
basic level, Professor Rose argues that physical boundaries, such as the 
dilapidated fence that graces the cover of her collection of essays, are 
essential to the declaration, “This is mine.” 31 But additional acts 
expressing a clear and unequivocal intent to exclude others are necessary to 
turn such physical boundaries into enforceable legal boundaries. The 
success of ownership claims depends on actions that both delimit one’s 
interest and are easily understood by others. The spatial and temporal 
contexts for such actions are key delimiting factors that either support or 
contradict ownership claims given certain cultural and societal 
expectations. So, As Carol Rose argues, complete and successful claims to 
ownership depend at least partially on actions that evidence an intention of 
long term commitment rather than a temporary or itinerant interest, at least 
within the agrarian/commercial societies from which our system of private 
property evolved.32  
The point of this is to stress that the timing of our actions with 
respect to property is important in determining the validity and extent of 
property rights. In addition, how we judge such timing is a product of 
specific cultural and societal expectations.  A hands-off itinerant form of 
occupation and use might be the basis of a cognizable and thus successful 
claim to property in some societies, but it is unlikely to support an 
ownership claim in traditional common law societies given their 
agricultural and commercial moorings.33 While claims that look too 
uncertain or evince a lack of commitment are shunned in the common law, 
so too are claims that appear to extend beyond the reasonable limitations of 
individual control. In short, built into our system of private property is the 
expectation that owners will be in control of and committed to their 
property as appropriate but not beyond that which is useful in a commercial 
society.  
If we look at this specifically through the lens of time rather than 
through the demands of commerce, the traditional common law regulation 
of property is well-suited to the “sheer pace of change” associated with 
31 Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and 
Rhetoric of Ownership, 1 (1994).  
32 Rose, Possession, supra. note 5 at 87. 
33 Stuart Banner, in his discussion of property law and the colonization of 
Australia, notes that “In the late eighteenth century, may believed that a society 
without agriculture was therefore a society without property rights in land.” Stuart 
Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropologhy and Property Law in Early Australia, 
23 LAW AND HISTORY REV. 95 (2005). 
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modern society.34 It privileges rules that encourage and enable flexibility 
and a quick response to changing circumstances. In short, given the pace of 
change, it would be irrational to allow individuals to retain interest in 
property well into the future under circumstances that are beyond our 
ability to predict. 
Thus temporal limitations can be understood and justified based on 
the centrality of property to the development of commerce and the general 
experience of time in modern society.  Clear boundaries both temporal and 
spatial are key to a system of property rights. How then should we 
understand the erosion of these temporal limitations? If temporal 
limitations in property are changing does this reflect changing assumptions 
about the role of property in our society?  Property law has traditionally 
engaged specific temporal logics that are decipherable and thus persuasive 
within a commercial/agrarian society. If these temporal logics are shifting 
can we take this as an indication of a larger cultural/societal shift in 
expectations about our relationship with property – or at least with respect 
to some forms of property? 
The following section looks at a number of doctrinal changes in 
property law that permit private property holders to control their property 
further into the future or alternatively to claim property from the distant 
past. All of these changes suggest a shift in our expectations about the 
legitimate temporalities of private property, at least in certain discrete areas 
of property law.  
 
 
II. THE FUTURE AND THE PAST IN OUR PRESENT CONCEPTION OF 
PROPERTY 
 
A.    Reaching into the Future 
 
The changes discussed below cover three doctrinal areas of 
property law. The first two are part of the traditional body of property law 
– the rule against perpetuities and servitudes. Changes in both of these 
areas permit interested property holders to retain control over their property 
perpetually, even though traditionally the common law guarded against this 
outcome. The third change comes from intellectual property law. Here the 
lengthening terms of intellectual property rights, in particular copyright, 
raise independent questions and problems while nonetheless sharing the 
same temporal peculiarities as the other examples.  
34 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 6 (1990) 
DRAFT COPY--NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION 8/28/2008  3:12:19 PM 
12 Harding Draft 
 
 
 
1. The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities   
 
Ask any law student what their most unpleasant classroom 
experience was and chances are that a significant percentage will point to 
the Rule Against Perpetuities (“the rule”). With its awkward method of 
time measurement that simultaneously depends on concrete and abstract 
concepts, students generally don’t get it.  Its focus on irrational possibilities 
- fertile octogenarians and unborn widows - rather than circumstances in 
real life has earned it the reputation as a trap for estate planners,35 
confounding the plans of those who wish to control their property well into 
the future. But peculiar as it may be it has been around for over 400 years 
and is one of the classic rules of the common law.   
The “modern” rule is typically traced back to the Duke of Norfolk’s 
Case,36 in which Lord Nottingham held an estate to be valid so long as it 
vested, if at all, during the lifetime of a person now alive. From there the 
rule eventually became “No interest is valid unless it must vest, if at all, not 
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest.” 37 On the assumption that those who know the rule need no 
further explanation and those who do not want no further explanation, I 
will not elaborate on the workings of the rule.38 
 The rule was crafted to prevent landowners from controlling their 
property too far into the future.39 While land was the primary focus of the 
rule, it came to encompass all interests, real or personal, legal or 
equitable.40 The purpose of the rule is relatively settled: it limits “dead 
35 The Irish Law Reform Commission Report on the question of the abolition of 
the rule suggests that the Rule acts as a “legal nuisance.” Report on the Rule 
Against Perpetuities and Cognate Rules (LRC 62-2000) at 52. The difficulties 
associated with the RAP are captured in the title of Barton Leach’s article, 
Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, (1952) 68 LQR 35 (1952).  
36 (1685) 1 Vern 164. 
37 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 174 § 201 (3rd ed. 
1915). 
38 For further discussion of the rule and its many trappings (literally) the classic 
text is GRAY, supra. note 37. 
39 But see, A.W.B. SIMPSON, LANDOWNERSHIP AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 37 
(1999)(arguing that the primary function of the rule was not to limit the interests of 
powerful landholders desiring to tie up their property for generations but rather to 
ensure a legal mechanism for doing so.)  
40 See, The Law Commission, The Rules Against Perpetuities and Excessive 
Accumulations §1.11. The Duke of Norfolk’s case was itself about a leasehold, an 
interest traditionally considered more personal than real property. 
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hand” control of property.  It affects a balance between the interests of 
current generations and future generations; it “strikes a balance between the 
wishes of the dead and the desires of the living with respect to the use of 
wealth.”41 The justifications for this limitation or balance are frequently 
voiced in economic terms. Along with a collection of other limiting rules, 
the rule against perpetuities came to embody the common law’s support of 
the free alienability of property or, in modern parlance, the free market. 
Judge Posner, for example, states: 
Not only are arrangements for the distant 
future likely to result in an inefficient use of 
resources brought about by unforseen 
contingencies; interests that do not vest till 
sometime in the distant future may be owned 
by persons as yet unascertained or even 
unborn making it difficult or impossible to 
obtain consent to a transfer. 42 
More recently, Professor Michael Heller states, “the [rule] 
conclusively presumes a point after which the social cost of fragmentation 
exceeds private gains.”43 While the marketability gains achieved through 
the rule may both justify and explain its resilience in the common law, 
many have observed that this fails to justify its application to trusts. Stewart 
Sterk states: “So long as the trustee has power to sell whatever land is held 
in trust (or whatever other assets the trust holds), concerns about 
marketability disappear.”44  
The balance achieved through the rule is also justified in non-
efficiency terms. For example a recent UK Law Commission Report 
emphasized fairness to future generations rather than efficiency as the 
primary basis for retaining the rule, albeit in a reduced and reformed 
state.45 This fairness justification is particularly relevant in the application
41 ROBERT J. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 10 (1966). See 
also T.P. Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission’s 
Flawed Philosophy 59(2) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 284-285 (2000). 
42 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 560 (5th ed. 1998); Lord Coke, 
writing in the late sixteenth century might have been the first to articulate an 
efficiency related justification for such limiting rules, emphasizing the need for 
property to be freely alienable. SEE WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH. III A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 85 (2nd ed.) 
43 Heller, supra. note 2 at 1180. 
44 Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the RAP, 24 CARDOZO L.REV. 2097, 2109 (2003). 
45 Law Commission Report 251, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Excessive 
Accumulations (1998).   
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of the rule to interests created in beneficiaries under a trust given that 
concerns about the free alienability of property are simply no longer 
.46
 
Despite its long and infamous career in the common law, it 
like the rule is finally on its way out.  Legislative alterations to the 
operation of the rule have slowly worn down its sharp edges,47 most 
significantly altering the peculiar way in which the rule turns on remote 
possibilities by initiating a “wait and see” approach48 or simply chan
the perpetuity term to a fixed eighty or ninety years.49 The Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, for example, provides that a non-
vested property interest will remain valid so long as it actually either vests
or terminates within ninety years.50 Most of these changes soften
thus allowing more settlements to remain intact.  But now many 
jurisdictions are abolishing it all together.51 In an essay entitled The Death
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Or the RAP has no Friends, J
46 HAROLD ARTHUR JOHN FORD AND WILLIAM ANTHONY LEE, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS § 7270 (3rd 1996); But see Sterk, supra. note 44 at 2110 (arguing 
that even the fairness justification doesn’t work well when dealing with equitable 
interests held in trust but he goes on to argue that the RAP does function to 
prevent the creation of trusts that would “generate agency costs and externalities 
without generating commensurate benefits.” Id. 2111-17)  
47 Legislation in the State of Illinois provides a good example of the types of 
changes that have been enacted. Legislation in that jurisdiction has been enacted to 
deal with the problems of the “fertile octogenarian,” the “unborn widow,” and 
interests created in individuals who must comply with an age restriction beyond 21 
and more generally has limited the harsh application of the rule by implementing a 
“wait and see” approach. 765 ILCS 305(4)(c). 
48 See, e.g., Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act (1990) s. 1(a)(2). For 
a full list of the states that have adopted this approach, see Jesse Dukeminier & 
James Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust 50 UCLA L.R. 1303, 1305-1307 
(2003). 
49 Id. See also R..POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 71.02[2]-[3].  
50 Id. The Uniform Rule Against Perpetuities Act is also incorporated in the 
Uniform Probate Code § 2-901(a)(2) (1990). 
51 For example, the rule has been abolished or severely limited in its operation in 
Alaska, Arizona. Colorado, Delaware, D.C., Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. For a full discussion of the 
legislative changes in these jurisdictions see Dukeminier and Krier, supra. note 48 
at 1311-1316.  
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perpetuities.”52 Whether out of disinterest in the regulation of perpetual 
trusts or perhaps even a desire for their existence, the primary rule 
constraining the time frame for the vesting of future interests has simply 
slipped out of fashion.   
There are a variety of good reasons for abolishing the rule - it is 
antiquated,53 complicated,54 ineffective, harmful, and unfair.55 Many of 
these arguments are not new. Strong opposition to the continuance of the 
rule was voiced at least fifty years ago.56  And yet the movement to abolish 
it seems to have picked up steam in just the last few decades. Stewart Sterk 
argues that in the United States the sudden race between jurisdictions to 
abolish the rule, at least as it applies to trusts, stems from the generation-
skipping transfer tax enacted by Congress in 1986, combined with other 
changes exposing lawyers to liability for failure to properly apply the rule. 
He states, “Lawyer self-interest joined tax avoidance as a reason to abolish 
the Rule.”57 Even jurisdictions that have opted for retaining the rule, have 
nonetheless considerably limited its application. The consequence has been 
steep rise in the creation of perpetual trusts.  The late Professor Jesse 
Dukeminier reports that the “number of perpetual trusts created nationwide 
now runs into the thousands per year.”58 
The recent history of the rule in the United Kingdom is instructive.  
Considering its “complexity and harshness” the rule underwent a first 
round of reforms in The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964.  The 
most significant reform arising out of that Act was the adoption of a “wait 
and see” approach.59 More recently, the Law Commission has suggested 
another set of reforms, most significantly that the rule be limited to 
“successive estates and interests in property and to powers of appointment” 
52 Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Or the RAP has No 
Friends – An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 603-604 (2000). 
53 See Leach supra. note 35 at 39(“The Rule persists in personifying itself to me as 
an elderly personage clothed in the dress of a bygone period …). 
54 See Dobris, supra. note 52 at 656. 
55 See The Irish Law Commission Report, supra. note 35. (Discussing all of these 
objections – and more). 
56 Leach supra. note 35. See also Dukeminier and Krier,  supra. note 48 at 1304-
1311(discussing the extended campaign to abolish or reform the rule). 
57 Sterk, supra. note 44 at 2101. 
58 Dukeminier and Krier, supra. note 48 at 1316. 
59 For a summary of this and other changes see The Rules Against Perpetuities and 
Excessive Accumulations, Law Commission Report 251 §2.13 (1998). The UK 
Government accepted the report but has yet to pass legislation implementing its 
objectives. See The Law Commission Annual Report 2006-07 p.16 - 
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0607/hc05/0552/0552.pdf .  
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leaving such rights as options and rights of pre-emption untouched by the 
rule.60 Additionally, the Law Commission has proposed that the perpetuity 
period be replaced with a fixed 125-year term.61 While it is plausible to 
argue that this and other fixed term amendments to the rule actually shorten 
the required time frame for the vesting of remote interests, it is equally 
plausible to argue that they are longer than a “life in being plus twenty-one 
years.” Furthermore, the fact that a “wait and see” provision typically 
accompanies a fixed term amendment leaves the final disposition of remote 
interests unsettled indefinitely. 
It is worth noting that the “death” of the rule is only the latest in a 
long drawn out eradication of rules designed to limit or control the creation 
of non-vested future interests. In the introduction to his classic treatise on 
the rule, written in the latter part of the 19th century, John Chipman Gray 
remarked, “originally the common law subjected [the creation of future 
interests] to many restrictions, but that these restrictions have been 
gradually so far removed that the rule against perpetuities is now almost the 
only legal check upon the granting of future interests.”62 If the rule is 
indeed the last significant barrier against the remote vesting of future 
interests, one is left wondering why we are so unconcerned about its slow 
disappearance.  
 
2. Servitudes in Perpetuity 
 
One of the most dramatic shifts in property law in the past fifty 
years has been the influence of environmental or ecological concerns. 
Where development was once allowed to proceed regardless of the 
environmental impact, environmental regulations now heavily limit the 
extent and conditions of property development. One need look no further 
than the growing body of U.S. Supreme Court Cases on the question of 
what forms of regulation constitute “takings” of property for the purposes 
of the Constitution to see the impact of such regulations on land use. Many 
of the recent regulatory takings cases relate to some form of environmental 
regulation.63 
60 Law Commission Report, supra at §§11.2. 
61 Id. at § 11.7 
62 Gray, supra. note 37 at 3 some of the other rules are the destructibility of 
contingent remainders and the merger rule.   
63 See eg. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886 
(1992); Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council Inc v. Tahoe Regional Planning, 535 
U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002). 
DRAFT COPY 8/28/2008  3:12:19 PM 
[2008]  PERPETUAL PROPERTY 17 
 
s of 
ty scene.   
 
Given the constitutional tensions and difficulties created by 
environmental regulations it is no wonder that one of the most important 
and heralded developments has been the conservation easement.64 
Professor Julia Mahoney notes that the number of acres protected by 
conservation easements “increased from 450,000 in 1990 to 2.6 million in 
2000. 65  By the end of 2005 that number had increased to more than 6.2 
million acres.66 As a private property67 based mechanism for the 
preservation and conservation of property, many have sung the praise
this relative newcomer to the proper 68
While it has been around for almost a century the conservation 
easement has only recently become a significant tool in conservation and 
has developed largely outside of the common law.69 The common law, in 
fact, jealously guarded against the adoption of new negative easements. 
The conservation easement, as a negative easement with the benefit 
typically held in gross, is particularly problematic.70 The common law 
blocked the growth of such restrictions on the use of land because they are 
64 For a general definition of a conservation easement (or servitude) see 
Restatement of the Law Third – Property: Servitudes § 1.6 (1) (“A Conservation 
servitude is a servitude created for conservation or preservation purposes. 
Conservation purposes include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-
space value of land, assuring the availability of land for agricultural, forest or 
recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, including plant and 
wildlife habitats and ecosystems, and maintaining or enhancing air or water quality 
or supply.”) 
65 Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on law and the Problem of the Future, 
88 VA. L. R. 739, 742 (2002) 
66 See Land Trust Alliance, 2005 National Land Trust Census Report (2005) 
available at http://www.lta.org/census/. See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, 
Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 ECOL. L.Q. 673, 675 n. 8 
(2007)(noting that the number of acres covered by conservations easements is 
even higher once one factors in land trusts that operate on a national level, such as 
the nature conservancy.) 
67 Although some have questioned the extent to which it is really private given its 
dependence on public provided incentives. See Leigh Raymond and Sally K. 
Fairfax, The “Shift to Privatization” in Land Conservation, 42 NATURAL 
RESOURCES J. 599, 626-628 (2002) 
68 See Mahoney, supra. note 65 at 743 (noting that conservation easements have a 
significant list of supporters and very few critics). 
69 But see Bennett v. Commissioner of Food and Agriculture, 576 N.E.2d 1365 
(Mass. 1991)(declaring validity of agricultural-preserve easement at common law 
on the basis that it is in furtherance of an important stated legislative goal) 
70 Andrew Dana and Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common 
Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 12-17 (1989). 
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not readily apparent, unlike the typical affirmative easement with its clearly 
marked intrusion on the burdened property.71 While the law of equitable 
servitudes has ushered in an expansion in the permissible range of such 
restrictions, particularly in the U.S.,72 such servitudes are generally subject 
to a host of complicated requirements, making them not the most user-
friendly form of property restriction.  
Given the common law’s suspicion of new non-possessory 
interests and dead hand control over property, conservationists turned to 
legislatures to establish the conservation easement. In 1981 the Uniform 
Conservation Easement Act was approved and since then over 40 states 
have passed legislation largely based on it, thus permitting the creation and 
subsequent enforcement of conservation easements.73  Comparable 
interests usually under the name conservation covenants have also emerged 
in New Zealand,74 Australia,75 and Can 76
The merits of this approach to conservation are not the focus of this 
commentary. Rather what is of interest to me is the latitude granted to 
current property owners choosing to restrict their property through 
conservation easements.  As with the disappearance of the rule against 
perpetuities and other related rules, these servitudes provide current owners 
71 Early attempts by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to obtain nonpossessory 
interests in land as a conservation tool were only marginally  successful because 
subsequent property owners were able to claim under the common law that the 
restrictions were not binding beyond the contracting parties. Mahoney, supra. at 
749; “The law has been very chary of creating any new negative easements” – 
Phipps v. Pears, [1965] 1 Q.B. 76 (Lord Denning) 
72 The most important addition is the recognition of covenants or servitudes 
imposing positive obligations on the burdened property holder, such as monetary 
payments. See Rudden, supra note 2.   
73 Mahoney, supra. note 65 at 750. 
74 Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust Act 1977, s.22 provides for the 
creation of “open space covenants” defined as a “legal agreement between the 
National Trust and a landowner, protecting privately owned open space… 
Covenants are registered against the title and are binding on all present and 
subsequent owners or leaseholders. Most open space covenants are in perpetuity.” 
(emphasis added) From the National trust web site, 
http://www.nationaltrust.org.nz/covenants/index.html 
75 See, eg. Victorian Conservation Trust Act 1972 s. 3A, providing for the creation 
of a “conservation covenant” to be held by the Trust; Soil and Land Conservation 
Act 1945 (WA) s. 30B; National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970 (Tasmania) s. 37B. 
76 Conservation Land Act, RSO c. C28; Land Title Act R.S.B.C. 1979 c. 219 s. 
215.  
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with unprecedented powers to affect the management of the burdened 
property indefinitely.  
It is important to recognize that conservation easements are 
permanent by design and many of the statutes that facilitate their creation 
actually require that they be perpetual.77 It is permanence, along with 
significant tax advantages,78 that makes them both unique and highly 
desirable. And while the collection of common law remedies that are 
available to remove or terminate servitudes may still be available, the terms 
of the legislation as well as the nature of the easement itself render such 
remedies ineffective. For example, the doctrine of changed circumstances 
is designed to permit the termination of an easement should it no longer be 
suitable given changes in the surrounding neighborhood. The application of 
this doctrine to conservation easements is problematic because changes to 
the surrounding environment are themselves reasons for the existence of 
the easement. Professor Mahoney states: “changed conditions of the 
neighboring land renders enforcement of the servitude all the more 
important because the burdened parcel represents the final vestige of the 
old landscape.”79 So we are left with a situation in which the servitude is 
explicitly defined as being permanent, the conditions for removal are very 
limited and the easement holder, typically a non-profit conservation 
organization or a government agency, has no real incentive to consent to 
termination.80 
The popularity of the conservation easement has emerged in 
tandem with a comparable development in the area of historic preservation. 
Here permanent easements, again granted to not-for-profit or government 
heritage organizations such as the Illinois Landmark Commission, are 
granted to ensure that the heritage aspects of privately owned property are 
preserved. The recent Restatement covering servitudes and the Uniform 
Conservation Easement Act include preservation or heritage based 
restrictions in their definitions. The Restatement defines preservation 
purposes as including “preserving the historical, architectural, 
archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.”81 As with the 
77 See, eg. CA Civil Code § 815.2(b). 
78 McLaughlin, supra. note 66 at 688. 
79 Mahoney, supra. note 65 at 778. 
80 See Id. for a spirited discussion of the permanence of conservation easements 
and the problems generated by this dead hand control.  McLaughlin, supra. note 
66 at 706-707 (arguing for a more cautious use of the perpetual conservation 
easement given the long term difficulties they pose).  
81 Restatement of the Law Third – Property: Servitudes § 1.6 (1), See Bagley v. 
Foundation of Preservation of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994). 
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conservation easement, the historic preservation easement is intended to 
last in perpetuity or so long as its intended purpose can be met. 
Of course the popularity of preservation and conservation 
easements is part of a larger trend embracing servitudes. As gated 
communities and condo developments continue to expand,82 the complex 
web of covenants and conditions controlling property thickens. These 
restrictions often have no definite end date and yet it is important to 
distinguish them from the conservation and heritage related easements 
precisely because the latter forms of restrictions are specifically designed to 
run in perpetuity with only marginal prospects of termination.  
 
 
 
 
3. Perpetual Rights in Knowledge and Ideas  
 
Perhaps the most interesting example of the temporal extension of 
property interests is the increasing time frame for intellectual property 
rights. Since World War II there has been a huge expansion in intellectual 
property rights leading to what John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos have 
labelled the “biogopolies” and “infogopolies” of the twenty-first century.83 
These sanctioned monopolies, with their lock on a vast array of knowledge, 
are at the forefront of the global economy, and they continue to expand 
through the international rules established under the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”). While the expansion 
of patents and copyrights into new areas of knowledge84 and information85 
has been central to the growing importance of intellectual property rights, 
the time expansion is no less remarkable.  
The most significant and apparent changes to the temporal 
boundaries of intellectual property rights are in the area of copyright. The 
82According to the Community Association Institute, a sixth of the U.S. Population 
now live in gated communities. The Economist August 30, 2001. 
83 JOHN BRAITHWAITE AND PETER DRAHOS, INFORMATION FEUDALISM (2002.) 
84 In patent law, the steady shift from a focus on mechanical processes to 
biotechnology and more recently genetic engineering has fundamentally altered 
patent law and exponentially increased the number of existing patents.  See 
BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra. note 83 at 150-168.  
85 While the expansion in copyright is less dramatic, the extension of copyright to 
computer technology, particularly software has had a significant impact on the role 
of copyright in controlling information. See Braithwaite and Drahos, supra. at 169-
186; Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLORIDA L.REV. 763 (2003) 
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recent court battle in the United States over the Copyright Term Extension 
Act86 (“CTEA”) put the question of the appropriate time frame for 
copyright directly before the U.S. Supreme Court.87 While perpetual 
copyright protection would indeed violate the Constitutional requirement 
that exclusive rights be “for limited times”,88 the majority found that the 
term established in the CTEA was not perpetual and the appropriate non-
perpetual term was a matter for Congress to decide.  Writing in dissent, 
Justice Breyer expressed concern that the most recent extension “make[s] 
the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual.”89  Later in his 
opinion he suggests that the new copyright term would, if the vesting of 
property were in issue, “violate the traditional rule against perpetuities.”90  
Aside from the question of constitutionality, the trend here is 
obvious – in the past 30 years the copyright term has moved from a 
maximum of 56 years (28 years from the date of publication, renewable for 
another 28 years)91 to an average of 95 years92 creating what Professor 
86 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998)(“CTEA”). 
The CTEA was the fourth such extension in U.S. legislative history.  The initial 
copyright term established in 1790 was 14 years from publication, renewable for 
another 14 years.  
87 Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003); (upholding the 
constitutionality of the CTEA, extending the duration of copyrights by another 20 
years).  
88 Constitution, Art 1, § 8, cl.8: “Congress shall have Power … To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Art, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” While 
there was some debate in English law about the existence of common law 
perpetual copyright, this view did not appear to take root in the United States. The 
Continental Congress had no power to regulate in this area and most states simply 
embraced the English limitations set forth in the Statute of Anne: “No state was 
disposed to view copyright as creating a perpetual rights.” Edward C. 
Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the 
Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. 315, 349 (2000). 
And a little later, “What is clear is that both Pickney and Madison did not want a 
perpetual copyright term but rather wanted something along the lines set forth in 
the Statute of Anne, that is to say, a limited term.” Id. at 354. 
89 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242; 123 S.Ct. at 801. 
90 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257; 123 S.Ct. at 808. 
91 This term was established in 1909: Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 
Stat. 1080-1081 and remained in place until 1976. 
92 The new term established under the CTEA is from creation until 70 years after 
the author’s death, estimated to produce on average 95 year copyright terms. 17 
U.S.C. § 302(a).  
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Peter Jaszi, refers to as perpetual copyright “on an instalment plan.”93 And 
from an economic standpoint the current copyright term “has nearly the 
same present value as an infinite copyright term.”94 
In other areas of intellectual property the time extensions have not 
been dramatic. In the area of patents, changes in U.S. law have extended 
the patent term but only marginally. The original patent term was fourteen 
years95 and today it reaches up to twenty years in keeping with TRIPS. 96 
Because of TRIPS, the same twenty-year term is now standard in many 
jurisdictions. But large corporate patent holders, particularly 
pharmaceuticals, have engaged in a number of tactics designed to further 
lengthen patent rights.97 Some of these have met with moderate success 
while others are typically prevented if caught. Most blatant of these is 
simply double patenting – successfully applying for another patent once the 
first term has expired.98 In the U.S. this was dealt a decisive even if 
needlessly complex blow in the termination of Eli Lilly’s second Prozac 
patent.99 The other more successful extension tactic is the “evergreening” 
93 Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 302 (1996) 
(quoting his own testimony in The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: 
Hearings on S. 483 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. (Sept. 24, 
1995)). 
94 Brief of George A. Akerlof, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Eldred v. Ahscroft, no. 01-618, 8 (U.S. Sup. Ct. filed May 20, 2002)(available on 
Lexis at 2001 US Briefs 618)(arguing that extending the copyright term increases 
the social cost of monopoly). For an economic argument in favor of indefinitely 
renewable copyright, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely 
Renewable Copyright, 70 U.CHI. L.REV. 471 (2003). In two separate articles, 
Justin Hughes and Joseph Liu also argue that the length of the copyright term 
might not be problematic if fair use and other public access rights  are 
strengthened over time. Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time 50 UCLA L. REV. 
775 (2003); Joseph P.Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
409 (2002).  
95 The fourteen-year term established in the 1790 Patent Act derived from the 
English Statute of Monopolies. This term lasted until the Patent act of 1861 when a 
seventeen-year term was adopted. It wasn’t until 1995 that this term was extended 
to twenty years to bring the law in line with TRIPS. Patent Code § 154(a)(2). 
96 TRIPS, Art. 33. 
97 See generally, Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property 
Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?. 41(2) IDEA – THE J. OF 
L. AND TECH. 227 (2001). It should be noted that in some jurisdictions 
pharmaceuticals also have a five-year extension of the standard twenty-year term.  
98 BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS supra. note 83 at 161. 
99 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (2001); For a comment 
on the complexities of this case see Hsin Pai, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, inc.: 
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of patents, a technique whereby pharmaceutical companies succeed in 
patenting new formulations and applications of a drug.100  
Other intellectual property interests are typically less constrained 
by specific terms. Trademarks, for example, are infinitely renewable 
provided they remain in use - they are and have always been potentially 
perpetual.101  But again other changes within trademark law have made 
perpetual trademarks more of a reality. The emergence of the “dilution 
rationale” for trademarks and the passage of anti-dilution statutes have 
given expanded scope to the notion of use.102 The enforceability of a 
trademark now depends more on the proprietary interests of the mark 
holder, “the business reputation or … the distinctive quality of a mark…” 
rather than the regulation of competition and the interests of consumers.103 
With the switch away from the interests of consumers to the property or 
authorship of the mark holder comes the distinct possibility of longer, more 
powerful and wide-reaching trademarks.104  
While these changes stop short of creating or endorsing perpetual 
intellectual property rights, there is a definite trend toward the lengthening 
of intellectual property rights, particularly in the area of copyright. 
Furthermore, unlike the prior examples where property interests are 
fragmented over time, intellectual property interests are monopolistic and 
thus enable long-term exclusive control. As a consequence the economic 
and societal effects of even a limited lengthening are likely to be 
significant.   
 
B. Retreating to the Past 
 
While the above examples indicate that with respect to some forms of 
property, property owners are increasingly able to control their property 
The Muddling of Obviousness Type Double Patenting Doctrine, 42 JURIMETRICS 
479 (2002). 
100 All Things Considered: Drug Patents (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 28, 2000) 
[hereinafter NPR, All Things Considered], available at 2000 WL 21472964.  
Glasgow, supra. note 97 at 234 (discussing the extension of the Augnmentin 
patent). See also David Pilling & Richard Wolffe, Drug Abuses, FINANCIAL TIME 
(London), Apr. 20, 2000, at 20, referring to these as “submarine patents.”  
101 See TRIPS art. 18 (“The registration of a trademark shall be renewable 
indefinitely.”) 
102 Federal Trademark Dilution Act (1995) 15 USC 1125(c). 
103 ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES, 70-
71 (1999). 
104 Id. at 71. 
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further into the future, so too can they reach further into the past to reclaim 
property. In the first example, the revival of customary rights, distinct 
groups have successfully retained rights to use privately held or otherwise 
inaccessible property based on usage for “time immemorial.” In the second 
example, prior owners are able to circumvent otherwise applicable 
limitation periods to claim important cultural objects.  
 
1. “Usage for time immemorial” – Customary Rights 
 
While the concept of “customary rights” has always held a 
cherished place in English law most commentators agree that, “until 
recently, one could fairly characterize the U.S. judicial reception to custom 
as a source of law as decidedly chilly.”105 So among the many changes in 
property law that run contrary to the common law’s abhorrence of 
perpetuities,106 the strangest must be the revitalization, albeit limited, of the 
doctrine of custom in establishing public access to private property.  
Customary rights in common law jurisdictions have their origins, 
like so many other property doctrines, in England’s manorial and feudal 
system. Rights claimed by individual tenants of a manor were recognized 
so long as the tenants could prove that the custom in question ran as far 
back into time as anyone could remember and was reasonable.107 What 
makes the doctrine of custom particularly interesting for the purposes of 
this paper is that it recognizes an inalienable, unending interest in affected 
properties, held by a specific, clearly identifiable segment of the public and 
that it justifies such interest based on usage for as long as the memory 
stretches. In this sense it depends on recognition running back in time and 
then enforces the rights in question indefinitely into the future.   John 
Chipman Gray remarked, “it should be remembered that [customary rights] 
cannot be released, for no inhabitant, or body of inhabitants, is entitled to 
speak for future inhabitants. Such rights form perpetuities of the most 
objectionable character.”108  
Aside from a general aversion to perpetual interests, “customary 
105 David Callies, Custom and Public trust: Background Principles of State 
Property Law?,  SE18 ALI-ABA 699, 703 (1999). 
106 [F]or courts of justice will not indulge even wills, so as to create a perpetuity, 
which the law abhors: because by perpetuities … estates are made incapable of 
answering those ends, of social commerce, and providing for the sudden 
contingencies of private life, for which property was at first established … 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, Ch. 11, 173-174. 
107 CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 123 (1994). 
108 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES  § 586 (3rd ed. 1914). 
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rights” were spurned in American law because of the factual requirement 
that the custom be traced back to time “immemorial.” Such a concept has 
little place in a nation where European colonization and the reception of the 
common law are well within recorded public/legal memory.109  The 
inconvenience and uncertainty that customary rights create for settled 
common law private property interests provide yet additional reasons for 
rejecting them.110  
Nonetheless some U.S. jurisdictions have recognized the existence 
of customary rights.111 In 1969 an Oregon court relied on customary rights 
to recognize a public right of access to the dry sand area of private 
beachfront property. The court stated: “It seems particularly appropriate in 
the case at the bar to look to an ancient and accepted custom in this state as 
the source of a rule of law.”112 To support the idea of usage for time 
immemorial, the court turned to evidence of Native American use of the 
dry sand area long before European colonization.  
Some American courts have rejected the notion of custom as an 
“archaic judicial response” relying instead on the less “fixed or static” 
concept of “public trust.” 113 Interests held under the public trust doctrine 
also may run indefinitely and thus can be seen as part of the rise of 
perpetual interests, although in a more limited way. Property interests held 
through the concept of public trust depend on proof of public need whereas 
the doctrine of custom primarily depends on continuity in the mere 
recognition of the rights in question, not usage or need.114 Property 
109 See, eg. Ocean Beach Ass. V. Brinley, 34 N.J. Eq. 438; Harris v. Carson, 7 
Leigh, 632 (va.)  
110 Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N.J.L. 125, 130-131 (1825). 
111 Knowles v. Dow, 22   N.H. 387 (1859) 
112 Thornton v. Hay, 462 P. 2d 671, 671 (Or. 1969). 
113 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A. 2d 355, 365 (N.J. 
1984)(holding that the dry sand area of a beach owned by a quasi-public body was 
open to the public through the public trust doctrine). The public trust doctrine as it 
applies to beaches, tidal and submerged lands itself has a long history stretching 
back at least to the 17th century and Matthew Hale’s treatise, De Jure Maris. 
Within in the United States it has experienced surges of popularity since the early 
19th c.  See ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra. note 107 at 115-116. The 
modern articulation and application of the doctrine is typically traced to Joseph 
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L.REV. 471 (1970).  A brief history of the legal recognition 
of public interest in tidal and submerged lands is also contained in Matthews, 471 
A. 2d at 360-362. 
114  See Callies, supra. note 105 at (around n. 26)(citing Blackstone for the 
proposition that it is the right of use, not the use itself, that must be proven.). 
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interests determined by public need are more changeable than those driven 
by mere public recognition. Nonetheless the key advantage of both o
approaches to the recognition of public access is that they steer clear of the 
Constitutional requirement of compensation for a “taking” of property 
because the public interest is presumed to have been there all along.  
Private property owners lose nothing – a right to exclude the public was 
never there to begin with. 115 
Perhaps because of their ancient status and their strange 
contradiction of common law property rights, customary rights have also 
caught on in Hawaii where native Hawaiians have used them as the basis 
for a variety of claims stemming from their traditional practices. For most 
of its history as a state, the customary rights of native Hawaiians were 
thought to be terminated by statute but in 1995 the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii made it clear that such rights do exist and may trump common law 
rights of exclusion.116  
Australian Aborigines and the Maoris of New Zealand have also 
resorted to the notion of customary rights as a means of protecting their 
traditional practices and ensuring access to private lands.117  While this is a 
contested innovation of the original English doctrine, it fits well with the 
experiences of these indigenous populations. Unlike the European 
populations that colonized these nations, the indigenous populations can 
trace their usage back for “time immemorial.” Furthermore, the doctrine 
was intended to apply to only specific communities and discrete practices, 
making it peculiarly apposite to the situations of these peoples.  So 
customary rights have been widely used outside of the United States as a 
115 This is a particularly convenient method of avoiding the possibility of 
compensation in the wake of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council given its 
stated exception for states’ “background principles of property law.” 505 U.S. 
1003, 11020-32 (1992). However Justice Scalia, the author of the Lucas opinion, 
has rejected the notion that such “new-found” doctrines are part of the 
“background principles”.  Stevens, 114 S.Ct. 1332, 1335 (1994)(denying cert., 
Scalia dissenting). For a discussion of whether customary rights are part of such 
“background principles” see Callies, supra. note 105.  
116 Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Council, 903 P.2d. 
1246 (Hawaii 1995); But see Hawaii v. Hanapi, 970 P 2d. 485 (Haw. 
1998)(doubting the applicability of customary rights to settled residential property) 
117 The Australian case law is probably the most extensive on the issue of 
customary rights and “native title”: see Mabo v. Queensland (No.2) [1992] HCA 
23. More recently the Australian High Court has begun to limit the rights 
associated with “native title”: see Yorta Yorta v. Victoria, [2002] HCA 58.  
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tool for the recognition of aboriginal rights.118 
There are a number of plausible explanations for why customary 
rights have reappeared in case law. In the context of beach access, 
customary rights can establish public access over a large area and against 
an entire category of property-owners without running afoul of the 
Constitutional requirement of compensation. In the area of aboriginal 
rights, the striking suitability of customary rights to the indigenous 
populations living within legal systems that offer very little else in the way 
of remedies, goes a long way to explain their popularity.119 But regardless 
of the explanation, it is evident that customary rights have arisen “phoenix-
like”120 from the remains of English property law providing yet another 
example of property interests running in perpetuity.  
 
2. Stolen Cultural Objects and the Irrelevance of Limitation Periods 
 
The restitution of personal property within the common law has 
always turned on the applicable limitation period. While neither a thief nor 
subsequent good faith purchaser can acquire good title to stolen objects, the 
passage of a statutory time period, typically anywhere from two to six 
years in U.S. jurisdictions, bars the original owner from claiming the 
property in question, at least as against a good faith purchaser.121 The 
consequence is that a good faith purchaser of personal property typically 
can feel secure about her title after the statutory time period for recovery 
has expired. This, however, is no longer the case when dealing with 
significant works of art or other cultural objects. Now it is possible for 
owners to reclaim such objects long after the passage of the relevant time 
period.122 
Changes in this area are related to two larger social/historical 
concerns. The first is the Nazi theft and illegal transfer of a significant 
118 See Kent McNeil, The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to the 
Existence and Content of Native Title at Common Law in EMERGING JUSTICE? 
ESSAYS ON INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 416 (Kent McNeil 
ed., 2001). Kent McNeil, Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal 
Title, 47 MCGILL L. J. 473 (2002). 
119 Callies, supra. note 105 at (just after note 140 in conclusion). 
120 Id. 
121 See Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. 
L. REV. 119 (1988/89). 
122 See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of 
Cultural Property in the U.S., 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995). 
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portion of Europe’s artistic treasures.123  Given the scale of Nazi looting 
and the broader context of the Holocaust, it is not surprising that the 
standard adverse possession approach was eventually found to be 
unsuitable.124 The first such case to deal with the issue in the U.S., Menzel 
v. List, concerned the ownership of a Chagall painting left behind in 
Belgium as the owners fled from the advancing Nazis.125 The relevant New 
York statutory time period had long since expired but the court permitted 
the plaintiff to sue for the return of the painting through applying what is 
now known as the “demand and refusal” rule.  Under this rule the cause of 
action does not accrue, and thus the limitation period does not begin to run, 
until the original owner demands return and the defendant refuses.126 While 
subsequent cases raised some doubts about the continued application of this 
rule, the New York Court of Appeals eventually affirmed it in Guggenheim 
Foundation v. Lubell,127 a case involving another Chagall. 
Other courts dealing with ownership disputes over stolen or 
missing art have followed New York’s lead and developed similar 
approaches to the tolling of statutory limitation periods. Most significantly 
the New Jersey courts developed what is known as the “discovery rule” in 
O’Keeffe v. Snyder.128  Under this approach, the cause of action does not 
accrue and thus the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the 
original owner has discovered the whereabouts of the stolen work, 
provided that she has used due diligence in her search. The discovery rule 
was also followed in a case involving Byzantine mosaics stolen from a 
Greek Orthodox church in Turkish occupied Cyprus.129 The “discovery 
rule” was also the inspiration for a statutory provision in California dealing 
with the recovery of stolen art.130  
123 See LYNN NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF THE EUROPE’S 
TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994). 
124 For a general discussion of the litigation surrounding Nazi looted art, see David 
Wissbroeker, Six Klimts, a Picasso and a Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to 
Recover Nazi Stolen Art, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. OF ART AND ENTERTAINMENT L. 39 
(2004); Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with 
the Need for Repose in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 155 (2007). 
125 Menzel v. List, 22 A.D. 2d 647; 253 N.Y.S. 2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964). 
126 Id. 
127 77 N.Y. 2d 311 (1991). 
128 416 A.2d 862 (1980). 
129 Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg, 717 F.Supp. 
1374 (1989).  
130 Ca. Code of Civ. Pro. § 338(c)(stipulating that the cause of action for the 
recovery of art and other related material does not accrue until the discovery of the 
whereabouts of the work in question).  
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In addition to these various judicial innovations, museums and 
governments around the world have initiated policies and guidelines 
designed to encourage and in some cases dictate the return of looted art to 
its original owners.131  The American Association of Museums Guidelines 
are typical in that they encourage members to “waive legitimate legal 
defenses” to claims for recovery of once-looted art works in order to 
achieve an “equitable and appropriate resolution of claims.”132 Many of 
these efforts have occurred in just the past decade following a sensational 
standoff between the City of New York and an Austrian art foundation over 
two Egon Schiele works that were apparently stolen by the Nazis. As a 
result of these many efforts, an increasing number of looted works have 
been and continue to be returned to their pre-World War II owners.133 
While these developments are an important piece of a larger reconciliation 
process with Holocaust victims it is important to note that they do 
contradict settled law in both civil and common law jurisdictions.  
The second major development concerns the return and protection 
of the cultural property of indigenous peoples.  The motivations behind 
these repatriations are similar to those driving the return of Nazi-looted art, 
most notably concerns about fairness, a desire to compensate for past 
injustices, and collective guilt.134 And the timing is also similar with the 
repatriation movement picking up steam throughout the world in just the 
past few decades.  Australia, New Zealand and the United States all have 
substantial laws dealing specifically with the cultural property of their 
indigenous peoples. Canada has not relied on legislation but accomplishes 
131 For a recent discussion of many of these initiatives See Paulina McCarter 
Collins Has the “Lost Museum” Been Found? Declassification of Government 
Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer Real Opportunity to “Do 
Justice” For Holocaust Victoms on the Issue of Nazi-Looted Art, 54 Me. L.Rev. 
115, 140-150 (2002). For a look at all these various policies, see 
http://www.comartrecovery.org/policies/established_list.htm 
132 American Association of Museums (AAM) Guidelines Concerning the 
Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, June 1998, sec. 4(f), 
available at http://www.comartrecovery.org/policies/established_list.htm. 
133 But see Jennifer Anglim Kreder, U.S. Museums' Use of Declaratory Judgment 
Actions in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, ART, CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
HERITAGE LAW NEWSLETTER, International Bar Association Legal Practice 7-8 
(October 2007) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999666 (Discussing 
pre-emptive approaches by museums to secure title to disputed works of art).  
134 See, Sarah Harding, Justifying the Repatriation of Native American Cultural 
Patrimony, 71 INDIANA L.J. 723 (1997). 
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repatriation through informal and voluntary mechanisms not unlike those 
that are now encouraging the return of Nazi-looted art.135  
The primary American legislation dealing with repatriations is the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”),136 
which requires federally funded museums to return cultural objects to 
culturally-affiliated tribes.  Given that most of the cultural objects in 
question have been in the possession of non-Native Americans for over a 
century, here again the return runs counter to the law of personal property 
in that it ignores the passage of the relevant statute of limitations. 
NAGPRA very specifically attempts to avoid the issues generated by the 
background common law and limitation periods by stipulating that 
museums do not need to return any objects for which they can prove a 
“right of possession,” but this “right of possession” is itself narrowly 
defined.137  For this and other more politically motivated reasons museums, 
despite their lack of enthusiasm for NAGPRA, have been cautious about 
utilizing the “right of possession” defense.    
Placing these changes in the context of the material above, we see 
again the possibility of ownership interests extending beyond the 
traditional temporal limitations imposed in property law.  Changing 
circumstances and our general intuition that claims weaken over time138 
have provided adequate justification for extinguishing rights over time but 
these reasons no longer seem to hold sway, at least in the areas discussed 
above. While it might be tempting to marginalize this particular 
development as just another example of the growing influence of human 
rights in Western legal systems these changes are also appearing in cases 
that are removed from the troubling human rights contexts discussed above. 
The O’Keeffe case in which the discovery rule was crafted had nothing to 
do with Nazi atrocities or the misdeeds of colonialism. The same applies to 
the Byzantine mosaics case. The California law mentioned above applies to 
all stolen articles “of historical, interpretive, scientific or artistic 
significance,” 139not simply those associated with a human rights violation.  
Undoubtedly these changes are connected to problems unique to 
the art and cultural object market: the increasing importance of this market, 
the simultaneous emergence of a thriving black market, archaeological 
135 Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at Common Law: A 
Contextual Approach, 63 U. OF TORONTO FAC. OF L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2005). 
136 25 U.S.C. §§3001-3013 (1994). 
137 25 U.S.C. § 3003(c); 3001(13). See Sarah Harding, Justifying the Repatriation  
of Native American Cultural Patrimony, 71 Indiana L.J. 723, 736-737 (1997). 
138 RUTI TEITEL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 138 (2000). 
139 Ca Code of Civ. Pro. § 338(c).  
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looting, cultural misappropriation, and more generally the relative ease 
with which art objects can be concealed. But these peculiarities should not 
divert our attention from the temporal consequences - individuals or groups 
are able to reclaim property long after their interests would have been 
terminated under traditional common law and legislative rules.  
 
C. Conclusion 
 
The five examples discussed above may seem isolated and random 
but they generate a few key observations. First, they stretch across all 
formal categories of property law – real, personal, intellectual and cultural 
property.  Customary rights and conservation easements are changes with 
respect to land; changes to the running of limitation periods in reclaiming 
art and cultural objects obviously fit within the law of personal or cultural 
property; and the intellectual property changes speak for themselves. The 
Rule Against Perpetuities applies to most forms of non-vested property 
interests.  So while these examples might seem random or even in some 
cases peripheral, alternatively we might see them as distinct niches in each 
area of property where perpetual interests are permitted to thrive.  
Second, the changes with respect to the conservation easement, the 
Rule Against Perpetuities and the copyright term are not in the least bit 
insignificant. The increasing number of acres subject to conservation 
easements is ample evidence of the significance of this new form of 
environmental protection. In former times the Rule Against Perpetuities 
loomed large in the law of property. Its long standing in the law has made it 
difficult to push aside; both its tenacity and the extensive discussion and 
debate around its removal indicate that its withering is anything but 
insignificant. 
The changes to the copyright term along with the broader growth 
of intellectual property rights are indisputably significant giving rise to 
volumes of commentary and scholarship. Whether one bemoans or 
applauds the increasing propertization of knowledge and information 
through, among other mechanisms, term extensions, it is difficult to deny 
the significance of intellectual property rights in the global economy. As 
Saul Levmore remarked in a brief article on the future of property “of 
course it is … ideas … which we can expect to come into play and to 
dominate our economy – and interest group activity – in the future.”140  
Third and finally, the temporal changes highlighted above have 
occurred through both judicial and legislative innovation. The more 
140 Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. OF CHI. 
L. REV. 181, 194 (2003).   
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significant changes, those that have permitted property holders to extend 
their claims further into the future, have been achieved through legislation. 
But the innovative revival of customary rights, the development of the 
public trust doctrine and the inventive interpretations of the tolling of 
limitation periods in disputes over cultural objects indicate some openness 
on the part of the judiciary to tinker with temporal limitations. 
  
III.  TIME AND THE CHANGING CULTURAL LANDSCAPE OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 
 
A.  Everything but Time 
 
It is possible to come up with entirely separate explanations for 
each of these changes, explanations that may in fact contradict rather than 
complement each other. But if we look at these various developments 
through the lens of time, we see a pattern that deserves some attention. The 
pattern or simple story that we could extract from all these examples might 
go like this. Within many discrete areas falling under the broad umbrella of 
property law, private (or even quasi-public) property holders are 
increasingly capable of maintaining interests in their property for longer 
periods of time. While perpetual interests have been a deep and abiding 
concern in property law for much of its history, we no longer seem to care 
that much about them.  In short we seem less concerned about limiting 
one’s control over or claim to property, to a specific and generally limited 
time frame.   
In most, but not all of the examples above, the expanded time 
frame also introduces more complexity and uncertainty into private 
property through either permitting the long term fragmentation of title, as 
in the case of the conservation easement, or creating uncertainty about 
future and current holdings, as in the case of the changes to the rule against 
perpetuities and the recovery of stolen cultural property.  While the 
lengthening of intellectual property rights do not present the same type of 
concerns, the long term monopolies created by such interests give rise to 
other well-documented efficiency problems. 141 
These changes are all quite remarkable given the common law’s 
traditional abhorrence of perpetual interests, not to mention its general 
preference for rules that encourage efficient use of property. So why are we 
141 Brief of George A. Akerlof, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, no 01-618, 8 (USSC filed May 20, 2002). 
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suddenly more willing to accept perpetual and fragmented property 
interests?   
 
1. Rent Seeking 
 
One plausible explanation for this increasing temporal 
permissiveness can be found in a cynical or “skeptical”142 law and 
economics story. Such an approach might explain these changes as the 
products of classic rent seeking behavior, the sort that is ubiquitous in the 
evolution of property rights. Accordingly, temporal changes might be the 
result of individuals seeking profits or advantages associated with the use 
and control of property, advantages that tend to leave society worse off 
when it comes to net social wealth. After all individuals have always 
desired perpetual interests in property143 and historically it was the courts 
and legislatures that limited such behavior through the establishment of 
various temporal and conceptual boundaries.144 In the various examples 
discussed above, rent-seeking works through an official change in the rules, 
rather than working within established rules, as would be the case of a 
holdout.145 So in addition to the rent seeking behavior this explanation also 
requires hypothesizing capture of the legislative or judicial process by the 
rent seeking individuals. 146  
142 Levmore supra. note 140 at 182-183. 
143 For a wonderful look at the persistent rent seeking of copyright and patent 
holders attempting to secure perpetual rights, see Edward C. Walterscheid, 
Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual 
Property Clause 7 J. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. 315, 334-340; 368-371 (2000).  
144 Although early in the development of copyright Lord Mansfield suggested that 
there was a perpetual property right based on the common law, a right that, if it 
truly existed, was restrained by legislation, not the courts. See Walterscheid, supra. 
note 143 at 334- 346 (discussing this history of the development of the first 
English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne 1710,  and subsequent debate over 
its interpretation and background rights).  
145 For a brief discussion of rent seeking both within the established rules and with 
the intent of changing rules see, Thomas Merrill, Rent Seeking and the 
Compensation Principle, 80 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1581, 1586-1587 (1986); 
for a more general discussion see  G. Tullock, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in 
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & 
G. Tullock eds. (1980). 
146 See Peter Drahos, Regulating Property: Problems of Efficiency and Regulating 
Capture, in REGULATING LAW 168 (Christine Parker, Colin Scott, Niki Lacey and 
John Braithwaite eds. 2004) (Merrill too.) 
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This may be a convincing explanation if we focus on the general 
trend – individuals seeking greater control of their property over time. But 
when we look closely at the examples it doesn’t always fit. Certainly rent-
seeking behavior is a plausible explanation for the changes to the RAP147 
and the lengthening terms in intellectual property rights. Peter Drahos and 
John Braithwaite convincingly argue that this is the most compelling 
explanation for the general expansion of intellectual property rights in 
international law.148 But it is less persuasive when we turn to the other 
examples. Profit-driven or self-interested motives can certainly be read into 
any of the above examples but such motives don’t always provide the most 
convincing explanation for the changes.  The conservation easement, for 
example, presents the possibility of an interesting mix of selfish and 
selfless motivations with tax advantages weighing in on one side and long-
term environmental concerns on the other. Thomas Merrill argues that this 
kind of legislation is “not easily placed under either the private-interest or 
the public-interest model, but rather reflect widely shared moral or cultural 
sentiments.”149 
The new rules regarding repatriation of cultural objects are equally 
complicated in that they can certainly be understood as the triumph of 
highly specified self-interested groups and yet the motivations here are best 
understood in human rights or corrective justice terms, not profits. In short 
not all of the changes have been driven by profit hungry individuals 
desiring to make the most of their property and unconcerned about the 
broader social impact. 
 
 
 
 
2. Efficiency 
  
The flip side of this “skeptical” rent-seeking story is the 
“optimistic” economic story, developed most prominently by Harold 
Demsetz in his immensely influential Toward a Theory of Property 
147 See Dobris, supra. note 52 at 639-641 (arguing that while the Rule was 
intended to benefit society over and above the preferences of individual 
landowners, it demise is part and parcel of our lack of interest in civil society and 
public life.) 
148 See DRAHOS AND BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra. note 83. 
149 Merrill, supra. note 145 at 1587. 
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Rights.150  According to Demsetz, as the costs and benefits associated with 
a specific resource change, property rights develop or change to produce 
the most efficient outcomes (either in terms of incentive and production or 
reduction of transaction costs).151 This is one of the many stories that, for 
example, intellectual property rights holders rely on to justify their 
expanding rights, including term extensions: changes in technology and the 
growing cost of research require longer lasting intellectual property rights 
in order to maintain the optimal balance between incentives to create and 
public access.152 Indeed it can be used plausibly to justify any of the 
changes even, according to Carol Rose, the rise of customary rights. 
Customary rights fit within a group of resources cleverly labeled comedic 
rather than tragic commons that become more valuable when more people 
have access to them – “the more, the merrier.”153  
But if we are going to rely on this justification for changing 
temporal limitations then we need to know what has changed such that 
longer running property interests are more efficient, because in the past the 
assumption has been quite the opposite. Indeed as was pointed out in the 
above discussion of time and property, a recent wave of articles on the 
numerus clausus in property has pointed to a raft of efficiency related 
arguments for the existing temporal and conceptual limitations in 
property.154 More than two decades ago Robert Ellickson provided detailed 
and convincing efficiency-based justifications for the rule against 
perpeptuities, the rules allowing for the termination of servitudes and 
shorter, not longer, limitation periods for adverse possession claims 
(although he focuses on the adverse possession of land, not chattels).155 
The puzzle this poses should be obvious. If efficiency requires that 
property remain flexible to enable appropriate responses to inevitable but 
yet unidentifiable changes in market conditions, why are we witnessing the 
rise of temporally unlimited property interests?  If anything, the pace of 
150 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 354 (1967). 
151 Levmore, supra. note 140 at 182. 
152 Although many are unconvinced that, at least in the area of copyright, longer-
lasting rights have any real impact on the incentive to create.  See Brief of George 
A. Akerlof, et al., supra. note 94.  
153 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently 
Public Property in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY 
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994). Economists also refer to this phenomenon 
as “network effects.”  
154 See Supra. at notes 26-30.  
155 Robert Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the 
Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (1986). 
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change in our current social and economic conditions would seem to dictate 
shorter rather than longer running property interests. In short either the 
efficiency argument simply can’t provide a compelling explanation for 
these temporal changes or at the very least we need a richer analysis of the 
effects of the quickening pace of change to provide the contextual 
framework for a convincing efficiency-related argument.  
 
3. Neoliberalism  
 
 A more persuasive explanation might be found in the rise of 
neoliberalism. Given that most of the temporal changes, in particular those 
that allow the running of perpetual interests into the future, can be 
understood as expansions of property rights, we could think of these 
changes as part and parcel of the swing away from Keynesian economics 
and towards greater reliance on the market and private mechanisms of 
control. Under such a theory there is a presumption against any rules that 
interfere with ownership or create restraints on alienation, including 
temporal limitations. Richard Epstein is arguably one of the most well-
known advocates of a neoliberal theory of property rights156 and so it 
should come as no surprise that he has argued against some of the temporal 
limitations or constraints in property law.  
In a now somewhat dated but nonetheless strikingly relevant 
article, Epstein argues that the only justification for interfering with 
“restraints of private alienation is to prevent the infliction of external 
harms.” Since, according to Epstein, the rule against perpetuities “and its 
kindred rules” are not directed to such harms, they serve no useful 
legitimate function.157 In short, Epstein argues for temporally unrestrained 
ownership rights, at least with respect to attempts to control property in the 
future. 
Whatever one thinks of the normative argument here this 
explanation at least has the virtue of fitting in with other current trends in 
property law. In this sense we can understand the temporal changes as yet 
another aspect of our steady move away from a centralized, “command and 
control” model of the regulation of resources to rising confidence in a 
156 See, RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
157 Richard Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of 
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705 (1986).   
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robust, unrestrained system of private property.158  This trend is evident in 
everything from the general privatization of world economies to the rise of 
gated communities159 and the emergence of market-based private property 
solutions to resources formally considered public goods, such as clean 
air.160  This explanation, like the “optimistic” economic story, sees the 
decreasing significance of temporal limitations as an intentional and 
desirable development rather than just a case of the fox guarding the hen 
house. But unlike the efficiency justification, unfettered private ownership 
under this approach is presumed to be more than just productive. It is seen 
as inherently more desirable because it is a fundamental element of one’s 
right to property.  
Despite the fact Epstein argues in favor of the rules of adverse 
possession, including a standard application of limitation periods, he does 
so on predominantly utilitarian terms, a theoretical shift for which he was 
roundly criticized. 161 If we stick with the neoliberal approach the rights of 
an original property-holder arguably take priority over all subsequent 
illegitimate claims regardless of the concerns about efficiency or certainty 
that are addressed by limitation periods destroying a right of recovery.162  
But even if we settle on this explanation we are still left with the 
nagging question why have these absolutist tendencies with respect to 
158 Carol Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 130 (1998); See also 
ANTHONY GIDDENS THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 164 (1990). 
159 See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE 
OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1996). (Maybe add Shearing on “Mass 
Private Property”) 
160 Rose, The Several Futures of Property, supra. note 158. 
161 See Ellickson, supra. note 155; (Radin critique too). 
162 Indeed there is some movement in this direction with respect to the adverse 
possession of real property. In 2005 the European Court of Human Rights held 
that the law of adverse possession in the United Kingdom violated the protection 
of property found in the European Convention on Human Rights. The case 
involved a very simple case of adverse possession with the usual mix of common 
law elements and a statutory limitation period. The Court concluded that the 
transfer of property without compensation to the adverse possessor violated the 
plaintiff’s right to “peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.” J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. 
V. The United Kingdom, no. 44302/02, ECHR 2005-II. Public outcry at the effects 
of adverse possession here in the United States have also led numerous states to 
propose changes to the law of adverse possession, in some cases prohibiting it all 
together. See Jay Romano, Adverse Possession: Mind Your Property, Real Estate, 
New York Times, November 11. 2007; Heath Urie, Adverse Possession Bill Set 
for Senate Committee, Boulder Daily Camera, March 4, 2008 (online edition). 
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property rights materialized or surfaced in the areas discussed? 
Furthermore arguably some of the changes are strikingly redistributive in 
nature and as such sit uncomfortably with Epstein’s neoliberal approach.163 
This is most apparent in the re-emergence of customary rights, the public-
trust doctrine and repatriation schemes. 
 
4. Certainty, Fairness and the Changing Face of Property 
 
There are a variety of other ideas we could explore.  Perhaps the 
changes reflect the simple reality that people live longer, or maybe the 
general decline in the significance of tangible property in a global 
economy.164 We live in an information society, dependent on intangible 
rather than tangible assets. If tangible property is unimportant, the rules that 
have been put in place to ensure socially beneficial uses will presumably 
also be of less importance. Setting aside the intellectual property material, 
some of the changes involve rather remote examples of tangible property 
that arguably have little to do with the economy and overall public welfare. 
Even the rule against perpetuities, with its roots in an era when land was 
the core of both social and economic life, is typically associated with land 
rather than the vast and diverse types of property interests to which it in 
fact applies.165  But this doesn’t explain why intellectual property rights are 
also getting longer. If all this turns on what is relevant to the growing 
global economy and we accept the economic arguments for temporal 
limitations, perhaps intellectual property rights should be getting shorter, or 
at least not expanding.   
It may also be the case that all these changes are simply part of the 
cyclical movement in property between clear or “crystal” rules, devoted to 
creating certain and definitive property rights, and fuzzy or “mud” rules 
163 However Epstein has argued that long-standing public rights in property are 
equally worthy of defense against the onslaught of legislation that might alter them 
without compensation. So, for example, Epstein rejects the extension of the 
copyright term as a legislative intrusion on existing public rights. Richard Epstein, 
Congress’ Copyright Giveaway, Monday Dec. 21 1998 Wall Street Journal A19; 
Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 123, 127-128 (2002) 
164 Gregory Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal 
Culture, 66 NYU L. REV. 273, 333-335 (1991)(discussing the rise of “imaginary 
property” or intangibles); DRAHOS AND BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, 
supra. note 83 at 198-99 (“wealth comes from controlling abstract objects”); 
Heller, supra. note 2 at 1174 (tangible property at the core of property conceptions 
but the locus of economic value has shifted to intangibles). 
165 See, Dobris, supra. note 52 at 635-639. 
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whose purpose is to inject an element of fairness.166 Given that the 
temporal changes tend to create greater uncertainty, could it be said that 
these rules simply reflect the mud part of the cycle? If so can we expect 
these changes to be followed by a new set of doctrines that re-impose 
clarity and more precise time frames for control over property? While we
may very well witness a swing back to the enforcement of temporal 
limitations, I am not sure the “mud” explanation is entirely adequate in this 
context.  Not all the rule changes discussed above, particularly the change
to the rule against perpetuities and intellectual property rights, are fuzzy, 
mud kind of rules. To the contrary these changes simplify the rules of th
game, arguably bringing more certainty to what counts as a viable property 
interest even if, as in the case of the rule against perpetuities, 
simultaneously encouraging greater fragm
So far this paper has presented a rather eclectic selection of 
reasons, both normative and descriptive, for the slow disappearance of 
temporal boundaries. All of the ideas presented above are worthy of further 
discussion and are potential candidates for both exploring and critiquing 
temporal changes.  Some combination of these explanations may be the 
most convincing and productive line of inquiry. But all of these approaches 
suffer from a significant shortcoming. Each and every one of them fails to 
deal directly with the temporal element. In each of the above justifications 
temporal limitations and their removal are secondary issues, simply by-
products of larger normative theories or social expectations.  In short, time 
wouldn’t matter much if we were to pursue any of the above ideas.  But if 
we take seriously the growing acceptance of perpetual property and 
Greenhouse’s observations about the importance of time in legitimating 
law then curiosity compels a search for something that looks more 
seriously at the temporal element. 
 This doesn’t mean that the above explanations are irrelevant or 
unpersuasive. To the contrary, temporal limitations appeared because of 
their tendency to encourage efficient and fair uses of property, not out of 
opposition to perpetuities per se. And so it may very well be the case that 
these same reasons have, in conjunction with changing cultural 
assumptions about property, prompted the removal of such limitations. But 
it is the changing cultural assumptions part of this - how we define fairness 
and expectations through time - that is worth exploring.  
166 Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STANFORD L. REV. 577 
(1988). (arguing that both types of rules are present in property law and in fact 
tend to appear in cyclical fashion, reflecting two important yet not wholly 
compatible cultural tendencies in the maintenance of a system of private property – 
desire for certainty on the one hand and fairness on the other). 
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B. Time, Stability and the Subjective Element in Property 
 
The new value placed on the transitory, the 
elusive and the ephemeral, the very 
celebration of dynamism, discloses a longing 
for an undefiled, immaculate and stable 
present. 167 
The circumstances that created our current market-driven system of private 
property and the temporal boundaries that go along with it seem not to have 
changed dramatically. In particular the demands of social, commercial and 
private life shift so rapidly today that we would expect there to be even 
more limited temporal boundaries in the ownership of property. The 
prevailing conditions of society even a single generation into the future are 
likely to be so different from today that long-term control of property 
seems anachronistic. Professor Mahoney captures this in her discussion of 
the conservation easement: “there is a certain irony in the fact that the 
number of acres under conservation easement has been growing rapidly at a 
time when old conceptual models of natural and cultural stability have 
begun to give way to more dynamic ones.”168 Why is it the case that at 
least in the limited areas discussed above, we strive for greater permanence 
and long-arm control over property when our current cultural conditions 
require greater flexibility?  How is it that in an era of rapid technological 
change we are more willing to tolerate perpetual property inte
If we put the notion of time front and centre what becomes most 
obvious is that the temporal expansion of interests in property has occurred 
under broader social conditions of what David Harvey has termed “time-
space compression.” Harvey uses this concept to elaborate on changes in 
how we represent the world to ourselves. At its core it is simply an 
articulation of the rapid acceleration of the pace of life and the 
167 Jurgen Habermas, Modernity: An Incomplete Project, in POSTMODERN 
CULTURE, 1 at 5 (H. Foster ed., 1985).  
168 Mahoney, supra. note 65 at 753; see also Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward 
Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1173 (2003)(discussing the changing approaches to environmental protection, in 
particular the shift from a focus on preservation to revival); See also Alex 
Geisinger, Rethinking Risk-Based Environmental Cleanup 76 INDIANA L.J. 367 
(2001)(critiquing  the “new cleanup paradigm” that restricts property use by 
predicting and then entrenching future property uses).  
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corresponding shrinking of space. Spatial barriers disappear as goods, 
information and people move rapidly from place to place. Revolutionary 
changes in transportation and communication technologies have radically 
reduced both spatial and temporal horizons.169 
These changes are most apparent in the flow of capital and the 
globalization of markets, but their effects are wide-ranging. Of these effects 
or consequences the most evident “has been to accentuate volatility and 
ephemerality”170 in just about every aspect of life – the notion that “all that 
is solid melts into air has rarely been more pervasive.”171 Actual tangible 
things pass through our hands with amazing speed generating labels such as 
the “throwaway” or “disposable” society. These observations are hard to 
reconcile with the changes in property law discussed above but the 
transitory nature of current social conditions and all that surrounds us is 
only part of the story.  Harvey goes on to state:  
But as so often happens, the plunge into the maelstrom 
of ephemerality has provoked an explosion of opposed 
sentiments and tendencies. . . . The revival of interest in 
basic institutions (such as the family and community), 
and the search for historical roots are all signs of a 
search for more secure moorings and longer-lasting 
values in a shifting world.172   
It is here in this oppositional tendency that we might find fertile 
ground for exploring the temporal changes in property. Accordingly our 
increased tolerance for perpetual property interests might reflect our desire 
for stability, permanence, and historical continuity when such things are 
scarce in other aspects of our lives. As Susan Stewart notes, within cultures 
defined by an exchange economy, saturated with fungible commodities, the 
search for something authentic and unchanging seemingly becomes 
critical.173  
This explanation begins to look stronger when we take another 
look at the areas where the temporal changes have occurred. Each of the 
areas discussed concerns either institutions or actual objects to which we 
tend to attach added personal, cultural or communal significance. The 
clearest example of this is in the area of cultural property. The cases and 
169 DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITIONS OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE 
ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 240 (1990). 
170 Id. at  285. 
171 Id. at 286. 
172 Id. at 292. 
173 SUSAN STEWART, ON LONGING: NARRATIVES OF THE MINIATURE, THE 
GIGANTIC, THE SOUVENIR, THE COLLECTION 133 (1993). 
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occasionally statutes are full of comments about preserving the past and 
protecting sacred connections.  As Harvey recognizes certain objects 
“become the focus of a contemplative memory, and hence a generator of a 
sense of self that lies outside the sensory overloading of consumerist 
culture and fashion.”174 Thus we have the meteoric rise of the market in art 
and collectibles; this has been a reliable place to “store value 
effectively.”175 Even the conservation easement can be seen as a reflection 
of our desire for permanence, an “undefiled, immaculate and stable 
present.”176 
The idea that our concerns about protecting the past and preserving 
our place into the future become more intense during times of technological 
change is not just a product of our current conditions. Stephen Kern writes 
about similar experiences in an earlier generation: “From 1880 to the 
outbreak of World War I a series of sweeping changes in technology and 
culture created distinctive new modes of thinking about and experiencing 
time and space.”177 This was a generation that looked to the past for 
“stability in the face of rapid technological, cultural and social change.”178 
It was during this time that England, France and Germany all passed 
legislation creating organizations such as the National Trust “to look after 
places of historic interest or natural beauty.” 179 
The temporal changes in the area of intellectual property can also 
be viewed in this light but admittedly only indirectly. On the one hand the 
changes to the copyright term seem most convincingly to be about profits, 
whether rent-seeking or efficient, and the need to harmonize U.S. law with 
the European copyright term (again for profit motivated reasons). And yet 
it was arguments and concerns about incentives, creativity, the sanctity of 
the creative product, the preservation of cultural heritage and the 
importance of protecting the expectations of heirs that tended to pave the 
way for expansion.180 Disney was perhaps the most vocal special interest 
174 HARVEY, THE CONDITIONS OF POSTMODERNITY, supra. note 169 at 292. 
175 Id. at 298. 
176 Habermas, supra. note 167 at 5. 
177 STEPHEN KERN THE CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE 1880-1918, 1 (1983). 
178 Id. at 36. 
179 Id. at 39. 
180 See testimony of Jack Valenti before the Senate Judiciary Committee: “A public 
domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. But everyone exploits 
its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its 
previous virtues.” Statement of Arthur R. Miller, Commentary, Extending 
Copyrights Preserves U.S. Culture, Billboard, 1/14/95 (included in the 
Congressional Record. A summary of all the Congressional testimony can be 
found at 
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advocate of the CTEA and yet its prominence in the debate over such 
legislation did not focus on profits but rather concerns about defiling those 
quintessential American cultural icons, Mickey and Minnie. 181 
Despite the variety of situations governed by the rule against 
perpetuities, its primary association is with the passing patriarch, the 
testator who wants only to see that his lifelong efforts are not squandered 
and that those he loves are well-cared for. It is fundamentally about ties to 
family and community – those institutions, according to Harvey, that we 
are striving to reinvigorate. The whole idea of dead-hand control is to 
maintain some persistent presence among kin long after all physical traces 
have disappeared. 
So while there are multiple plausible explanations for why 
temporal limitations are disappearing in some areas of property law, 
equally plausible is the idea that some areas are perceived as being more 
important to personal and cultural identity and as such are more susceptible 
to claims about the importance of permanence and preservation. Because of 
this perception, whether real or imaginary, we let our guard down and 
ignore the significance of boundaries and rules that have been put in place 
to protect broader social interests. We are quick and eager to buy into the 
story of the struggling self - the struggling creator, the patriarch who just 
wants to care for his family, the victims of ethnic and cultural genocide 
wanting to reclaim something of their own, the environmentalist or public 
advocate looking to preserve a little of the past for the generations of the 
future – because it resonates with our personal experiences and our own 
desire for stability. 
In short if property law has been shaped by both subjective 
preferences and objective rules based on broader concerns about social 
utility, we might see the changes discussed as a leaning toward the 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/CT
EALegislativeHistoryOutline.html.). See also Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
104-315, 104th Congress, 2d Sessions, July 10, 1996 (detailing concerns about 
incentives for creativity and protecting claims for iconic works still popular and 
profitable). 
181 Rarely is there a mention of the CTEA in the popular media without reference 
to the expiration of copyrights on Mickey Mouse and his friends.  See, e.g. Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices to Review Copyright Extension, NEW YORK TIMES (February 
20, 2002)(mentioning the concern about Mickey Mouse entering into the public 
domain). For more material see the documents and articles referenced at 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentar
y.html and 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legislative.h
tml.  
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subjective preference side of the equation. While it is plausible that this 
leaning stems from a growing acceptance of neoliberalism with its 
emphasis on absolute property rights, it is equally plausible that such 
changes simply reflect our yearning for enclaves of stability in the midst of 
ceaseless flux. Furthermore, this approach, unlike the neoliberal claims, 
helps explain the discrete nature of the temporal changes. While Epstein’s 
approach would apply to all property interests, the arguments presented 
here help explain only the limited areas discussed above or other areas 
where we might recognize a significant cultural or personal element – areas 
where it makes sense to seek greater permanence and stability.  
This isn’t as far-fetched as it may sound. Emphasis on the 
subjective element of ownership, the importance of imagination and 
psychological attachments, has been a key element in property theory 
going back at least to Hume who stressed the importance of conventions in 
the construction of property rules.182 More recently Erving Goffman’s 
work showing that even under conditions of the starkest deprivation, we 
strive to create property, enclaves of privacy and stable presence, often 
appears in discussions of property.183 Margaret Jane Radin is probably th
scholar most responsible for reinvigorating this aspect of property, drawing 
out the personality element in property and the importance of this element
in the construction of legal rules relying predominantly on Hegel.184  
recently, Peter Benson has argued for a subjective, “self-authenticating” 
element in principles of first occupancy.185  
Returning to Greenhouse’s observation about time and law, we 
might say that the shift toward perpetual property reflects the “out of time” 
aspect of law – a desire for constancy rather than the excessive flux 
embedded in current conditions of the linear story. Surely the linear story is 
till the predominant story in property law. The notion of private property is 
fundamentally and intricately connected to our cultural obsession with 
progress, growth and economic development. But integral to the mythic 
status of law and property is the idea that there is always a permanent, 
unchanging and impenetrable entitlement.  
182 Treatise on Human Nature, (“Of the origin and justice of property” and “Of the 
rules which determine property”) Book 3, Part 2, Sections 2-3. 
183 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients 
and Other Inmates, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW (R. Ellickson, 
C. Rose and B. Ackerman eds. 1996).  
184 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STANFORD L. REV. 957 
(1982).  
185 Peter Benson, Property in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Cane 
& Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). 
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While a focus on the subjective element in property is not unusual I 
have used it primarily as a descriptive tool leaving the larger normative 
questions untouched. It is presented here as a plausible alternative to the 
other strong contender for understanding these temporal changes, the one 
suggested by Richard Epstein and actually argued for in temporal terms 
almost twenty years ago. While Epstein’s approach would apply to all 
property interests, the arguments presented here help explain only the 
discrete areas discussed above. The recognition of a perpetual property 
category whose perceived function at least partially is to provide greater 
security in an ever-changing world, is arguably problematic not to mention 
easily co-opted by rent seekers. But as a reflection of the larger social and 
cultural responses to our current societal conditions it seems inevitable and 
as such worthy of further attention.   
 
Conclusion 
Legally cognizable property rights are culturally contingent. Both 
the scope and breadth of property rights has changed over time, driven by 
the shifting needs and desires of individuals within society as well as the 
erosion of some resources and the discovery of others.  Ownership claims 
or rights to property have been temporally circumscribed because such 
limitations were necessary in agrarian/commercial societies but also 
because the temporal boundaries served to legitimate the institution of 
private property in terms that were socially cognizable.  Such temporal 
boundaries reflected the limits of fairness and effective management of 
resources over time.  In many ways these temporal limitations are more 
important than ever and they persist in important ways. But with changes in 
society, with the rapid pace and our constant state of flux, comes the 
possibility of changing temporal limitations in areas where we might 
logically seek refuge from the dizzy pace of life. Anthony Giddens 
remarks, “where tradition lapses, and lifestyle choice prevails, the self isn’t 
exempt. Self identity has to be created and recreated on a more active basis 
than before.”186 It is in this desire to recreate something personal, 
meaningful and lasting that we can being to see the cultural legitimation of 
perpetual property.  
  
186 ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD 65 (2000). 
